Kentucky Law Survey: Domestic Relations by Graham, Louise Everett
Kentucky Law Journal
Volume 73 | Issue 2 Article 5
1984
Kentucky Law Survey: Domestic Relations
Louise Everett Graham
University of Kentucky
Follow this and additional works at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj
Part of the Family Law Commons, and the State and Local Government Law Commons
Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits
you.
This Special Feature is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Kentucky Law
Journal by an authorized editor of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.
Recommended Citation
Graham, Louise Everett (1984) "Kentucky Law Survey: Domestic Relations," Kentucky Law Journal: Vol. 73 : Iss. 2 , Article 5.
Available at: https://uknowledge.uky.edu/klj/vol73/iss2/5
Domestic Relations
By LOUISE EVERETT GRAHAM*
INTRODUCTION
During the survey period, the Kentucky appellate courts
faced a series of cases that involved not only the usual problems
relating to property division, post divorce support obligations
and child custody, but which also implicated a number of federal
statutory attempts' to regulate areas long considered solely the
province of state regulation. 2 The presence of new federal leg-
islation in these areas represents Congressional attempts to solve
some major difficulties in the domestic relations area. Few per-
sons would argue, for example, that the battle for jurisdiction
in child custody cases was either helpful or appropriate in re-
solving custody disputes in a manner best serving the interest of
the child.3 Without suggesting that such legislation is necessarily
inappropriate, it is important to point out that the entry of
federal legislation into this area provides new and substantial
pitfalls for the practicing attorney and his or her client. For that
reason, the cases faced by the courts this survey period are
especially important.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. B.A. 1965, J.D. 1977,
University of Texas.
I Federal legislation now actively regulates the divisibility of private pension funds
upon divorce. Under the Retirement Equity Act of 1984 Congress has set new standards
for divorce treatment of pensions covered by the Employee Retirement Security Act of
1954. See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d) (1982), amended by 29 U.S.C.A. § 1056(d)(3) (West
Supp. 1984). Federal legislation also regulates certain areas of child support enforcement.
See 42 U.S.C. §§ 651-665 (1982), amended by Child Support Enforcement Amendments
of 1984, P.L. No. 98-378, 98 Stat. 1305 and 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 666-667. Finally, the
Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980 affects jurisdiction in child custody cases.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1982).
The Supreme Court regularly resurrects the statement from In re Burris, 136
U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890), that "[t]he whole subject of the domestic relations of husband
and wife.., belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the United States,"
even when the Court is about to override the law of the state on the basis of preemptive
federal legislation. See, e.g., McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 220 (1981); Hisquierdo
v. Hisquierdo, 439 U.S. 572, 581 (1979).
See text accompanying notes 150-52 infra.
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Kentucky courts have dealt with the divisibility upon divorce
of pension benefits in several past cases. Under rules developed
in these cases, vested pension benefits may be divided if they
accrued during the marriage4 and are not subject to federal
legislation which prevents their treatment as divisible marital
property.5 Nonvested pension benefits are not subject to treat-
ment as divisible marital property; however, they may be con-
sidered for purposes of awarding maintenance or child support. 6
During this survey period the Kentucky Court of Appeals ad-
dressed the problems of private pension plans which are regu-
lated by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).7
James and Lynne Owens were divorced in 1983 after twenty-
three years of marriage.8 James, an attorney, was a member of
a law firm that maintained two employee benefit plans subject
to ERISA. 9 The trial court awarded Lynne a one-half interest in
James' interest in the employee benefit plans. 0 James appealed,
raising both state and federal issues with regard to his pension
benefits. James first argued that the pension benefits were non-
vested and therefore not subject to division under state law."
Second, he argued that the anti-attachment clause of ERISA
restricted the Kentucky court's ability to treat his pension plan
as divisible marital property.'2 The appellate court held that
ERISA was not a bar to state court division of qualified retire-
ment plans. 3 It also held that James' plan was vested rather
than nonvested since he had a current right to plan proceeds. 4
4 See Foster v. Foster, 589 S.W.2d 223, 224 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
See Russell v. Russell, 605 S.W.2d 33, 35 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980), cert. denied,
453 U.S. 922 (1981); Frost v. Frost, 581 S.W.2d 582, 583 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979). The
Russell result has now been affected by Congressional action. See Uniform Services
Former Spouses' Protection Act, 10 U.S.C. § 1408 (1982). For a discussion of the
changes see Graham, Domestic Relations Survey, 71 Ky. L.J. 445, 466-69 (1982-83).
6 Ratcliff v. Ratcliff, 586 S.W.2d 292, 293 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979).
29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1381 (1976).
Owens v. Owens, 672 S.W.2d 67 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).
9 Id. at 69.
Id.
Id.
12 Id.
" See id.
'" See id.
[Vol. 73
1985] DomESTIC RELATIONS
In ruling that ERISA posed no bar to the divisibility of
retirement benefits, the Kentucky court followed a Seventh Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals decision, Savings and Profit Sharing Fund
of Sears Employees v. Gago.'5 The Gago court held that state
property division statutes were not preempted by ERISA's gen-
eral preemption section 6 and that the anti-attachment require-
ment of ERISA was not a bar to property division by a state
court. 7 Although other circuits have reached conclusions similar
to that reached by the Seventh Circuit,' 8 the view that ERISA
did not bar attachment has not been unanimous. 9 Moreover,
this lack of unanimity might have signaled serious problems for
spouses claiming interests in private retirement funds because of
' 717 F.2d 1038, 1043 (7th Cir. 1983).
61 See id. at 1040. Section 514(a) of ERISA states that it "supercede[s] any and
all State laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan"
described in other sections of the act. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). The Supreme Court has
ruled that a New York statute prohibiting discrimination in employee benefits on the
basis of pregnancy was superceded by ERISA rules that did not prohibit such discrimi-
nation. See Shaw v. Delta Airlines, 103 S. Ct. 2890 (1983). The Shaw decision implied
that its broad reading of the words "relate to" in the statute might not encompass state
marital property laws. See 103 S. Ct. at 2901-02 & n.21.
" See 717 F.2d at 1041-43. The anti-attachment clause in ERISA bars the assign-
ment or alienation of benefits provided by a covered plan. See 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(I).
The Gago court declined to read the clause as being in direct conflict with state marital
property law. See 717 F.2d at 1041. The court also noted that Congressional intent to
protect the pension holder was not intended to protect that holder from familial support
obligations. See id. See generally Graham, State Marital Property Laws and Federally
Created Benefits: A Conflict of Laws Analysis, 29 WAYNE L. REv. 1, 29-42 (1982).
"1 See Carpenters Pension Trust v. Kronschnabel, 632 F.2d 745 (9th Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 453 U.S. 922 (1981) (ERISA does not preempt state-court orders requiring
pension plan to pay community property share of participant's monthly benefits to his
former spouse); Operating Eng'rs' Local #428 Pension Trust Fund v. Zamborsky, 650 F.2d
196 (9th Cir. 1981) (ERISA does not preclude garnishment of participant's pension
benefits to satisfy court-ordered maintenance); AT&T v. Merry, 592 F.2d 118 (2d Cir.
1979) (garnishment of accrued pension benefits to satisfy state-court ordered family
support obligations impliedly excepted from ERISA provision preempting state law);
Cody v. Riecker, 594 F.2d 314 (2d Cir. 1979) (garnishment of pension benefits to satisfy
state-court ordered judgment for arrearages in support obligations not preempted by
ERISA). See also Weir v. Weir, 413 A.2d 638 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1980) (husband's
unmatured right to noncontributory pension fund subject to equitable distribution in
matrimonial action); Kikkert v. Kikkert, 427 A.2d 76 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981),
aff'd, 438 A.2d 317 (N.J. 1981) (husband's vested pension plan providing for future
benefits to husband if he survived equitably distributable in divorce action).
'1 See Francis v. United Tech. Corp., 458 F. Supp. 84, 86 (N.D. Cal. 1978);
Kerbow v. Kerbow, 421 F. Supp. 1253 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
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the Supreme Court's decisions in Hisquierdo v. Hisquierdo0 and
McCarty v. McCarty.2' In each of these cases the Court had
read federal legislation to protect the rights of the employee
spouse, treating anti-attachment clauses and other legislation
creating pension benefits as bars to state court division of those
assets upon divorce.22
Issues with regard to divisibility of private pension plans
have now been solved dispositively by amendments to ERISA.
Those amendments are collectively known as the Retirement
Equity Act of 1984.23 Under the Retirement Equity Act, state
courts are permitted to divide a spouse's interest in an employee
benefit plan regulated by ERISA if that division is made by a
"qualified domestic relations order."' 24 To be a qualified order,
a court's judgment, decree or order must meet several threshold
requirements. First, the order must give an interest in the "par-
ticipant" spouse's benefits to the nonemployee spouse, who is
generally designated as an "alternate payee" by the Act. 25 Sec-
ond, the order must provide the names of the participant and
alternate payee and their addresses. 26 Third, the order must
clearly specify the amount or percentage of the participant's
benefits to be paid to the alternate payee and the number of
439 U.S. 572, 590 (1978) (railroad retirement benefits).
21 453 U.S. 210, 235-36 (1981) (military retirement benefits).
2 The Hisquierdo Court found that division of the benefits did "major damage"
to a "clear and substantial" federal interest. See 439 U.S. at 581 (1978). Hisquierdo
was particularly important because it concerned a retirement benefit system that had
aspects of a private pension plan. See id. at 574-75. Further, the regulating legislation
contained an anti-attachment clause similar to that of ERISA. See 45 U.S.C. § 231m.
The McCarty opinion imperiled state court division because of its expansive interpretation
of federal interests. See Graham, supra note 17, at 37-41.
23 Pub. L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1426 (1984).
4 Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-397, § 104, 98 Stat. 1433
(amending 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)).
Id. The legiilative interpretation of the bill states that the order may create or
recognize the alternate payee's right or assign the participant's rights to the alternate
payee. 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 2566. This language was probably chosen
to cover the rights of spouses in community property states as well as the rights of
spouses whose interests arise in states using the deferred community concept. The
difference was never material except for tax purposes. Since Congress has changed the
tax rules, even that importance may no longer exist. See generally id. at 2569 (discussion
of tax treatments under Retirement Equity act of 1984).
6 Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub L. No. 98-397, § 104, 98 Stat. 1433, 1434
(amending 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)).
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payments or period for which payments are required. 27 Fourth,
the order may provide neither for increased benefits nor for any
type or form of benefits, including options, that are not other-
wise provided for under the plan.28 Finally, the order may not
require that benefits payable to an alternate payee under a prior
qualified domestic relations order be paid under it to a different
alternate payee. 29 Given the serious concern with federal preemp-
tion under ERISA, the Retirement Equity Act demonstrates
congressional willingness to forego federal preemption in a very
limited area. Attorneys who wish to claim for their clients a
portion of covered retirement plans must now take care to bring
themselves within the boundaries delineated by Congress.
The Owens court also dealt with the divisibility of a vested
but unmatured pension under state law.30 The court's general
definition of vesting was unremarkable and followed from prior
cases. 3' A vested pension is one in which the employee's rights
are not forfeitable 3 2 except under limited statutory conditions.33
As long as James' rights under the pension plan were vested,
the benefits could clearly be treated as divisible marital property
under current Kentucky law. 4 The appellate court also indicated
" Id. For a discussion of the difficulties involved in drafting proper qualified
domestic relations orders, see Troyan, Pension Evaluation in Light of the Retirement
Equity Act of 1984, 11 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 3005 (1985).
23 Id.
11 Id. These restrictions do not prevent trial courts from requiring payment to the
alternate payee once the participant achieves his or her earliest retirement age without
regard to whether the participant actually retires. See 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
Naws 2566. Further, trial court orders may apparently require the payment of survivor's
benefits. The act thus permits trial courts to assure that pension benefits will be received
by the nonworker spouse in those cases in which delayed distribution is used.
Some courts had previously assumed the power to prevent an employee spouse
from electing a benefit that significantly disadvantaged the nonemployee. See, e.g., In
re Marriage of Gillmore, 629 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1981); In re Marriage of Lionberger, 158 Cal.
Rptr. 535 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979), cert. denied sub nom., Operating Eng'rs' Pension Trust
v. Lionberger, 446 U.S. 951 (1980); McDermott v. McDermott, 10 FAM. L. REP. (BNA)
1187 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984).
Owens v. Owens, 672 S.W.2d at 69.
' See Foster v. Foster, 589 S.W.2d 223.
"2 Id. at 224.
" Prior to the enactment of the Retirement Equity Act, the preretirement death
of the employee spouse could cause a forfeiture of even vested benefits. Under the new
rules certain plans must provide retirement benefits to the survivors of participants with
vested benefits. 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmN. NEws 2548-49.
N See 589 S.W.2d 223.
1985]
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its strong disapproval of the current division of vested but un-
matured pension benefits on the facts of Owens.15 The appellate
court relied upon the tax consequences3 6 to both the participant
spouse and other plan beneficiaries in determining that the di-
vision should become effective only when the benefits were
actually received by the employee spouse. 37
The appellate court's use of an "if and when received"
distribution of the benefits raises some questions. First, to the
extent that courts are willing to delay distribution of pension
benefits until the employee's right is mature, there seems to be
no logical reason to distinguish between vested and nonvested
pensions. Nonvested pensions have been held nondivisible in
Kentucky on the ground that they were too speculative for
division.3" In cases involving nonvested rights on the brink of
vesting, a decision to terminate a marriage in one year rather
than another may deprive a spouse of any property claim to a
significant asset. 39 To the extent that nonvested rights are too
speculative for division, this problem would be cured by delayed
distribution. In the past, delayed distribution of pension benefits
was of limited benefit to nonemployee spouses. However, under
the Retirement Equity Act of 1984, a trial court may require
that a former spouse receive the survivor's benefits now available
under the Act. 40 The court may also require that these benefits
be payable to an alternate payee even in those cases in which
the participant elects to work past retirement age. 4 1
' 672 S.W.2d at 69. In earlier cases, however, the court had noted that delayed
distribution is not preferable when it may be avoided by current offsets. See Combs v.
Combs, 622 S.W.2d 679, 681 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981).
16 For a discussion of the tax treatment of benefits under the Retirement Equity
Act of 1984, see 1984 U.S. CONG. & ADMIN. Naws 2569.
17 See 672 S.W.2d at 69.
1, See Ratcliff v. Ratcliff, 586 S.W.2d 292.
"9 This argument was accepted in one of the earliest reasoned decisions ruling that
nonvested benefits could be divided. See In re Marriage of Brown, 544 P.2d 561, 566-
67 (Cal. 1976). Because pensions represent deferred compensation for work done during
marriage, they are clearly earned during marriage although they may be received later.
See Van Loan v. Van Loan, 569 P.2d 214, 215-16 (Ariz. 1977); Pieper v. Pieper, 398
N.E.2d 868, 871-72 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979); Kikkert v. Kikkert, 427 A.2d 76, 78 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981); Farver v. Department of Retirement Sys., 629 P.2d 903,
904-05 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981), aff'd, 644 P.2d 1149 (Wash. 1982).
40 See note 29 supra.
41 See id.
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Federal legislation thus permits a trial court to balance the
interests of both spouses. Through a delayed distribution order,
the court can protect the employee or participant spouse from
being called to account for benefits that will never be received.
Similarly, the court can protect the nonemployee spouse (the
"alternate payee") by requiring in its order that the employee
spouse not ele-" retirement benefits that disadvantage a former
spouse. This legislation, however, does not make divisible ben-
efits that are not otherwise divisible under state law.4 2 It cannot
be used to require Kentucky courts to divide nonvested pensions.
Further, the federal legislation has no impact upon state statutes
that exempt from division certain pensions not covered by ER-
ISA.4 3
II. POST DIVORCE SUPPORT OBLIGATIONS
A. Adult Support
Post divorce support obligations generally provide courts
with a number of difficult issues. The cases arising during this
survey period have proved no exception. Appellate courts have
again faced the problem of reimbursement for a spouse who
aided in the acquisition of a professional degree. Additionally,
the courts have contended with the effect of post divorce coha-
bitation upon a maintenance agreement and with the problem
of child support for adult dependent children.
In McGowan v. McGowan,44 the Kentucky Court of Appeals
held that a lump sum maintenance award was permissible when
one spouse had worked while the other spouse was in under-
graduate and dental school and the couple had accumulated no
significant marital property. Although the court acknowledged
that Randy McGowan's degree was not marital property, it relied
upon the maintenance statute and the cases interpreting that
statute to permit an award to his former spouse.4 5 The McGowan
" See generally Graham, supra note 17, at 43-44.
" See, e.g., Ky. Rav. STAT. ANN. §§ 427.120, .125 (Bobbs-Merrill 1972) [hereinafter
cited as KRS].
663 S.W.2d 219 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983).
"' See id. at 223. A second point at issue in McGowan was the trial court's
jurisdiction over Randy McGowan. The McGowans had married in Kentucky and
1985]
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opinion continues the struggle to balance the interests of the
parties when one spouse has earned a professional degree or
license during marriage. Despite its attempt to alleviate some of
the confusion arising from the Supreme Court's dicta in Inman
v. Inman,46 the case raises interesting questions of its own.
continued to reside in the state while Randy was an undergraduate at Kentucky Wesleyan
and attended dental school in Louisville. In July 1979, they moved to New York state
for Randy's residency in oral surgery. They separated in December 1979, and in April
or early May Fredda returned to Kentucky with their child and a separation agreement
signed by Randy consenting to jurisdiction in this state. Although the trial commissioner
later ruled the separation agreement unconscionable, he retained jurisdiction over the
case. The appellate court agreed upon two grounds. First, there was no specific showing
that Randy failed to understand that signing the agreement submitted him to Kentucky's
jurisdiction. Second, the 180-day residency requirements were not applicable when Ken-
tucky residents were temporarily absent from the state. Thus, the court treated the
jurisdictional aspect of the separation agreement as severable. It also demonstrated the
ease with which a Kentucky domicile may be found for former Kentuckians. See id. at
222-23.
" 648 S.W.2d 847, 852 (Ky. 1982). The Inman litigation has been before both the
court of appeals and the Kentucky Supreme Court. In the first Inman decision, the
court of appeals ruled that an educational degree was sufficiently similar to other forms
of property to permit an award to the nondegree holding spouse when the marriage
terminated without acquisition of property. See 578 S.W.2d 266, 269 (Ky. Ct. App.
1979). The Supreme Court later indicated in dicta that the degree was not marital
property but that both the nondegree holder spouse's contributions and the degree
holder's increased earning capacity should be considered in any award formulated by a
trial court. See 648 S.W.2d at 852. See generally Graham, supra note 5, at 452-57. Other
jurisdictions have witnessed similar litigation. In the majority of those jurisdictions the
advanced degree has not been treated as marital property. See, e.g., Pyeatte v. Pyeatte,
661 P.2d 196, 201 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982); In re Marriage of McVey, 641 P.2d 300, 301
(Colo. Ct. App. 1981); Zahler v. Zahler, 8 F m. L. REP. (BNA) 2694, 2695 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Aug. 5, 1982); Wright v. Wright, 469 A.2d 803, 805-06 (Del. Fam. Ct. 1983);
Hughes v. Hughes, 438 SO. 2d 146, 147 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); In re Marriage of
McManama, 399 N.E.2d 371, 374 (Ind. 1980); In re Marriage of Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d
885, 891 (Iowa 1978); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 453 A.2d 527, 532 (N.J. 1982); Ruben v.
Ruben, 461 A.2d 733, 735 (N.H. 1983); Muckleroy v. Muckleroy, 498 P.2d 1357, 1358
(N.M. 1972); Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747, 750 (Okla. 1979); Frausto v. Frausto,
611 S.W.2d 656, 659 (Tex. Civ. App. 1980); In re Marriage of Lundberg, 318 N.W.2d
918, 921-22 (Wis. 1982); Grosskopf v. Grosskopf, 677 P.2d 814, 822 (Wyo. 1984). Other
jurisdictions permit some consideration of the degree in maintenance and property
awards, although they do not treat it as property. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Weinstein,
11 FAm. L. REP. (BNA) 1015 (11. App. Ct. Nov. 13, 1984); DeLa Rosa v. DeLa Rosa,
309 N.W.2d 755, 758-59 (Minn. 1981); Lowrey v. Lowrey, 633 S.W.2d 157, 160 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1982); Lira v. Lira, 428 N.E.2d 445, 448 (Ohio Ct. App. 1980); Washburn v.
Washburn, 677 P.2d 152, 159-60 (Wash. 1984). Michigan treats the degree as marital
property when there are no other substantial assets. See Woodworth v. Woodworth, 337
N.W.2d 332, 334-35 (Mich. Ct. App. 1983). New York courts have disagreed over the
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The McGowan opinion both expanded the kinds of spousal
contribution that may now lead to compensation and retracted
the importance of those types of contribution for future cases.
First, the court noted that neither "the efforts" nor the "eco-
nomic sacrifices" of one spouse who had put the other through
school should go uncompensated.4 7 Although past cases have
considered the monetary contributions of the nondegree holding
spouse 4 8 they have not dealt with the more general notions of
efforts and economic sacrifices. 49 Perhaps the court's language
with regard to efforts and economic sacrifices was simply meant
to indicate that, upon divorce, a homemaker spouse's contri-
bution to the other spouse's acquisition of a degree may be
considered. This interpretation accords with the treatment of
homemaker spouses in other cases.50 Alternatively, however, the
economic sacrifices concept could raise other questions. For
example, is the spouse who does not acquire a degree entitled
to compensation for his or her own foregone income or the
foregone income of the student spouse?5 1
matter. Compare Lesman v. Lesman, 452 N.Y.S.2d 935, 938-39 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982)
(not divisible) with O'Brien v. O'Brien, 452 N.Y.S.2d 801, 803 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1982)
(divisible), aff'd as modified, 485 N.Y.S.2d 548 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985). Massachusetts
treats degrees as marital property. See Reen v. Reen, 8 F m. L. RaP. (BNA) 1053 (Mass.
P. and Fain. Ct. 1981).
47 See 663 S.W.2d at 223.
48 See Inman v. Inman, 648 S.W.2d 847, 852 (Ky. 1982); Moss v. Moss, 639
S.W.2d 370, 374 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982).
41 In at least two cases, courts have dealt with spouses who provided support but
did not contribute to educational expenses. See Lesman v. Lesman, 452 N.Y.S.2d 935;
Mahoney v. Mahoney, 442 A.2d 1062. The failure to provide educational expenses is
relevant only if the court adopts a rigid reimbursement theory. Cf. note 46 supra. In
Moss v. Moss the Kentucky Court of Appeals intimated that the supporting spouse's
recovery should be reduced by amounts provided by the student spouse's family. See
639 S.W.2d 370.
., The contribution of a spouse as a homemaker is relevant to the distribution of
marital property. That contribution does not, however, have the effect of converting
nonmarital property into marital property. Brandenburg v. Brandenburg, 617 S.W.2d
871 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981). The McGowan court noted that two avenues were open to
compensate the nondegree holder spouse. Where property had accumulated, an imbal-
anced award could be used. Absent such an accumulation, however, the court held that
the maintenance statute permitted an award. See 663 S.W.2d at 223-24. Neither of these
theories clashes with prior rules governing homemaker contribution. See KRS § 403.190
(1972).
1' See Krauskopf, Recompense for Financing Spouse's Education: Legal Protection
1985]
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If the court meant to recognize homemaker contributions, it
later took away much of what it had given when it upheld the
trial court's assertion that, although essential,5 2 Fredda's contri-
butions did not "greatly inure to Randy's direct financial en-
hancement. ' '53 The McGowan facts do indicate that the degree
holding spouse did not greatly improve his financial position
upon completing his education.5 4 The court's language is dis-
turbing, however, because it may have either of two undesirable
effects. First, McGowan could signal to trial courts that it is
permissible to place a relatively low value on homemaker serv-
ices. Second, it may create a rule that permits a degreeholder to
avoid realistic reimbursement by unilaterally devaluing the degree
through deliberate under- or unemployment.
The court's decision also plainly demonstrates the confusion
surrounding compensation in such cases. The court approved
the award to Fredda remarking that she could not individually
enjoy the same standard of living that she had enjoyed as
Randy's wife. 55 As Judge Paxton pointed out, a student's stand-
ard of living is not likely to be a sumptuous one.5 6 The court's
theory, therefore, must have been that Fredda was entitled to
what she would have enjoyed as Randy's wife had the marriage
continued.17 Two distinct difficulties arise from this analysis.
for the Marital Investor in Human Capital, 28 KAN. L. REv. 380, 385 (1980) (discussing
the concept of foregone income).
52 See 663 S.W.2d at 225.
See id.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 226 (Paxton, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
17 Cf. id. at 226-27. The court's citation of Casper v. Casper, 510 S.W.2d 253,
255 (Ky. 1974); Atwood v. Atwood, 643 S.W.2d 263, 266 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982); and
Combs v. Combs, 622 S.W.2d 679, 680 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981) demonstrates this point.
Casper is locally famous for Mr. Justice Palmore's statement that what is appropriate
employment for a "duchess" is not the same as the employment appropriate for a
"scullery maid." See 510 S.W.2d at 255. Read broadly, Casper indicates that one who
marries well is entitled to preserve that status even though the marriage terminates. The
notion of marriage as an avenue to social or economic status is probably offensive to a
number of persons today. More recent thinking permits compensation based upon
spousal contribution, including opportunities foregone, rather than upon preservation of
status. Both Atwood and Combs support an emphasis on spousal contribution. Each
case involved a long term marriage and a spouse whose absence from the marketplace
had damaged her earning capacity while contributing to the family's enrichment. See
643 S.W.2d at 266; 622 S.W.2d at 680.
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First and most importantly, the actual award given by the court
bore no relation to its theory. Despite both the essential nature
of her contribution and her entitlement under the court's theory,
Fredda received only $10,000 58-far less than she would have
enjoyed as Randy's wife59 and substantially less than she would
have received had the court simply reimbursed her for one-half
of her monetary contributions during the marriage.60
As Professor Krauskopf has pointed out, there are two pri-
mary justifications for the continued use of maintenance under
present no-fault divorce laws with equitable property distribu-
tion schemes. 6 ' The first of these justifications is that mainte-
nance will be necessary to compensate a homemaker spouse
whose absence from the marketplace has enriched the family
unit but also left that spouse with severely reduced opportunities
for increased earning capacity.62 The second justification, more
relevant to McGowan, is that maintenance is appropriate to
compensate a spouse for his or her contributions to the family
economic unit when the equitable distribution of property cannot
achieve that result.63 Although Kentucky courts appear to be
moving toward recognition of this second justification for main-
tenance, 64 they have not yet attempted to deal with the conse-
quences of realistically measuring the nondegree holding spouse's
contributions.65
11 663 S.W.2d at 225.
1 For a helpful discussion of the process of valuing the degree, see Krauskopf,
supra note 51, at 382-84.
60 The court rejected the formula it used in Inman, because it believed that the
formula would have been required to return $44,000 to Fredda and leave Randy with
significant educational debt. 663 S.W.2d at 225. If Fredda's salary paid for both of
their living expenses, however, Randy should have been liable for an amount that would
represent her contributions to his expenses rather than for her total earnings.
61 See Krauskopf, supra note 51, at 397-98.
62 Id.
0. Id.
6 The use of the maintenance statute rather than the property division statute
avoids some of the problems with future earning capacity. The property division statute
does not appear to sanction division of assets earned after the marriage. See Graham,
supra note 5, at 455.
6 Professor Krauskopf has argued that a share of future earning capacity should
trigger a lump sum maintenance award unless the nondegree holder spouse fails to put
on the evidence to justify such an award. See Krauskopf, supra note 51, at 400-02.
However, future earning capacity is not all gained at one time and to some extent it
depends upon incremental earning which occurs after the marriage terminates. See
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In Lydic v. Lydic,66 the Kentucky Court of Appeals consid-
ered the effect of post divorce cohabitation upon an obligation
to pay maintenance. Jack and Dreana Lydic were divorced in
1974 after a thirteen year marriage. 67 Their divorce decree in-
corporated a separation agreement under which Jack agreed to
pay Dreana $600 per month until she died or remarried.6 The
agreement also provided that it was final and nonmodifiable."
Sometime in 1981 Dreana purchased a home in New Jersey with
Arthur L. Zepf, Jr., a single man.70 Arthur and Dreana shared
expenses and held the home as joint tenants with right of sur-
vivorship. 71
When Jack moved to terminate his alimony obligations both
the trial court and the appellate court agreed to a dismissal of
his motion. The appellate court distinguished Williams v. Wil-
liams,72 in which it had held that a lasting relationship with an
affluent friend, coupled with the former husband's financial
difficulties, were sufficient to terminate alimony. It noted that
in the case before it there was no evidence that Arthur was
contributing to Dreana's support; rather the evidence suggested
Graham, supra note 5, at 455. If the compensation awarded is based upon the nondegree
holder's contribution to the opportunity for such earnings, some theoretical difficulties
will be avoided. The value of that opportunity might be the value of an entry level
position multiplied by the expected work life of the degree holding spouse, less other
costs such as educational loans. The other costs for obtaining the degree must be
subtracted from its value under theories of "family firm" economics. Cf. Krauskopf,
supra note 51, at 386-87.
664 S.W.2d 941 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983).
67 Id. at 942.
68 Id.
69 Id.
7I Id.
71 Id.
- 554 S.W.2d 880, 882 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977). The court's comments on Williams
suggest that Lydic asked primarily for termination rather than modification. See text
accompanying notes 83-87 infra. The court also attempted to distinguish McCord v.
McCord, 558 S.W.2d 624, 626 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977), in which it had denied the rein-
statement of maintenance to a wife whose subsequent marriage had been annulled. The
court's distinction of McCord is somewhat less than convincing. The question in cases
such as Lydic is whether relationships other than marriage should be grounds for
terminating maintenance or modifying an award. To insist that McCord is inapplicable
because Dreana did not remarry begs the question.
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that the parties shared expenses. 73 Additionally, the court noted
that the separation agreement itself barred modification. 74
No other issue concerning the economic aspects of divorce
generates the strong emotional response that attends the circum-
stances of cases similar to Lydic. As the dissent noted, "[t]here
is something distasteful in requiring one to subsidize a former
spouse, in his or her subsequent cohabitation. ' 75 In part this
difficulty arises from the various permissible uses of the main-
tenance statute.76 As pointed out in the previous discussion of
compensation for contribution to an advanced educational de-
gree, the maintenance statute may be used to deal both with the
homemaker spouse whose absence from the marketplace has left
that spouse with reduced earning capacity and with the spouse
making economic contributions to the family economic unit
which will be not be adequately compensated by property dis-
tribution.77 In the latter case the obligor spouse is not supporting
the present needs of his or her former spouse but repaying that
spouse for past contributions already received. 78 Courts consid-
ering the issue have not been careful to distinguish the reasons
underlying the maintenance obligation. 79 Separating out different
"1 See 664 S.W.2d 942-43.
7, See id. at 943.
1, Id. (Miller, J., dissenting). For a general discussion of the problem and proposed
solutions, see Oldham, The Effect of Unmarried Cohabitation By A Former Spouse
Upon His or Her Right To Continue To Receive Alimony, 17 J. FAi. L. 249, 251-53
(1978-79); Oldham, Cohabitation By An Alimony Recipient Revisited, 20 J. FAM. L.
615, 631-39 (1981-82).
76 See KRS § 403.200 (1972).
7 See text accompanying notes 61-63 supra.
"' This rationale supports the maintenance awards in Atwood v. Atwood, 643
S.W.2d 263, 266 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982) and Combs v. Combs, 622 S.W.2d 679, 680 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1981). See also Frost v. Frost, 581 S.W.2d 582, 585 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979). Each
of the maintenance awards in those cases can be justified because a spouse in a long
term marriage had enriched the family unit through her work within the home. Recent
Kentucky case law provides few examples of support awards based on a pure "need"
without offsetting contributions. However, in Carter v. Carter, 656 S.W.2d 257 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1983), the appellate court indicated that even very short term marriages could
give rise to support obligations and "status" entitlements based on the standard of living
enjoyed during the marriage. See id. at 260. Carter demonstrates the danger posed by
thinking of maintenance awards in terms of status. Cf. note 57 supra.
79 To a large extent the use of maintenance awards rather than property division
derives from the fact that many divorcing couples have little or no property. See
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types of maintenance obligations should add some clarity to a
previously clouded issue.
Some other facets of the problem may not be so simple to
solve. Even those states that agree that other relationships short
of remarriage should terminate the maintenance obligation have
difficulty in determining which relationships should trigger ter-
mination."0 Although the announced criteria is generally that the
second relationship must be "stable and ongoing," 8' case law
demonstrates that in some instances the sexual nature of the
relationship is the crucial aspect.82 An example will highlight the
problem with such a rule. If Alice and Bob share a $500 per
month apartment and a sexual relationship, one might ask how
Alice's economic needs are different from those she would have
if she shared the apartment, but not the sexual relationship, with
Chris. In each case Alice needs a sum of money for housing
each month. If the maintenance obligation were set only with
reference to Alice's support and if it provided for $500 per
month for housing, Alice now needs one-half as much for her
housing whether she lives in an intimate relationship with Bob
or a nonintimate relationship with Chris. 8a The question should
Weitzman, The Economics of Divorce: Social and Economic Consequences of Property,
Alimony and Child Support Awards, 28 UCLA L. REV. 1181, 1188 (1981).
1 See In re Marriage of Sappington, 10 FAm. L. REP. (BNA) 1445 (Ill. App. Ct.
June 19, 1984); Roofe v. Roofe, 10 F~i. L. REP. (BNA) 1292 (Ill. App. Ct. April 3,
1984); In re Marriage of Clark, 444 N.E.2d 1369 (Ill. Ct. App. 1983). Illinois statues
add to remarriage as - condition for terminating maintenance the instances in which the
recipient cohabits on a "resident, continuing conjugal" basis. See ILL. Rav. STAT. ch.
40, § 510(b) (Smith-Hurd 1984).
8' See Roofe v. Roofe, 10 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 1292.
See, e.g., In re Sappington, 10 FAm. L. REP. (BNA) 1445; Brown v. Brown, 10
FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 1240 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 6, 1984). In Brown the agreement
provided that maintenance terminated if the recipient wife "lived with" another man.
Mrs. Brown rented a part of her home to a man. The court ruled that they did not
"live together" because there was no credible evidence of a sexual relationship, Mrs.
Brown did not cook for her tenant, and she had no independent social relationship with
him. See id.
11 I do not mean to suggest that all relationships that Alice might have could give
rise to such considerations. For example, if Alice asked her aged mother, Doris, to move
in with her so that she could care for Doris, the result might be different. Doris may
have no ability to support herself; she may be Alice's dependent. Further, the pre-
existing relationship of parent-child between them indicates that Alice has not taken on
some new relationship at the expense of her former spouse. Thus, the Alice-Doris
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be whether Alice's projected decreased need is substantial and
continuing enough to revise the parties' support agreement. 4 In
substituting the question of whether a relationship is sexual for
the issue of whether it is one that involves an arrangement that
should trigger modification just as any other change in circum-
stances, courts have resurrected the historic "sex, society and
service" for "support" exchange. 85 That rationale rarely under-
lies modern maintenance awards86 and it is an inappropriate
framework for analyzing termination of maintenance.
Jack Lydic's loss in litigation, however, may be traced to
another aspect of the case. Because the Lydics' agreement was
not modifiable by its own terms,87 the court of appeals was faced
with an all or nothing situation. The court could either affirm
the maintenance agreement or terminate maintenance entirely. If
Lydic had argued that equity demanded setting aside the non-
modification clause because of unforeseen circumstances, the
court might have justifiably granted the modification, assuming
that it was not related to Dreana's past contributions to the
family economic unit. Lydic's lesson to future litigants is that
the parties themselves may define the types of future relation-
ships that will terminate maintenance. Absent that definition,
additional litigation may be needed to adjudicate their respective
rights.
relationship is different from Alice-Bob or Alice-Chris, even if Bob or Chris is not self-
supporting.
U This is the standard in a number of states. See Gertrude L.Q. v. Stephen P.Q.,
466 A.2d 1213, 1216 (Del. 1983); Bentzoni v. Bentzoni, 442 So. 2d 235, 238 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1983); Bisig v. Bisig, 469 A.2d 1348, 1350 (N.H. 1983); Gayet v. Gayet, 456
A.2d 102, 104 (N.J. 1983); Van Gorder v. Van Gorder, 327 N.W.2d 674, 678-79 (Wis.
1983). But see Bell v. Bell, 10 FAm. L. REP. (BNA) 1679, 1680 (Mass. Sept. 13, 1984).
The use of substantial and continuing changed circumstances should not be interpreted
to disadvantage a spouse who has sought to meet growing needs. If, for example, a
spouse with a one year maintenance award of $500 per month finds that due to rent
increases he or she must share an apartment, his or her needs have not been reduced by
that arrangement.
1 See H. CLAu, DOMESTIc RLAoNs 181 (1968).
See authorities cited supra note 78.
See 664 S.W.2d at 942. KRS § 403.250 provides that the death of either party
or remarriage of the recipient terminates the maintenance obligation unless the parties
otherwise expressly agree in writing or the decree so provides.
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B. Child Support
Federal legislation enacted during the survey period will re-
sult in major changes in the enforcement of child support obli-
gations. The Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984
require states to develop particular enforcement remedies in or-
der to continue participating in federal Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) programs."" Further, these support
collection procedures will be available to all persons who seek
to collect support through state agencies, whether or not those
persons are AFDC recipients.8 9 Thus, many litigants will find it
to their advantage to use the new procedures.
The federal legislation requires states to establish an expe-
dited procedure for the collection of child support.90 To meet
this requirement the Kentucky legislature enacted the Kentucky
Administrative Process for Child Support Act.91 Under that act-
unless child support is established by court order-the Cabinet
for Human Resources (CHR) may determine support for a child
whose parent has failed to provide support. 92 The cabinet may
determine the amount of support owed based upon a scale
developed pursuant to administrative regulation.93 Because that
scale provides significantly higher support for some income ranges
than the child support guidelines currently used by many circuit
courts,94 participation in the administrative process is advanta-
geous to a party seeking child support. Further, the administra-
tive process places the burden upon the support obligor to request
- See 42 U.S.C. §§ 626(a)-(b), 666 (1984). For a thorough discussion of the federal
legislation, see Dodson & Horowitz, Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984:
New Tools for Enforcement, 10 FAm. L. REP. (BNA) 3051 (Oct. 23, 1984).
8 Dodson & Horowitz, supra note 88, at 3051. See also KRS § 205.721 (1984).
See 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2).
KRS §§ 405.400-.530 (1984).
92 KRS § 405.430 (1984). Because parent is statutorily defined to exclude fathers
whose paternity has not been established, the adminstrative process cannot be used to
determine support obligations in these situations. See KRS § 405.420(5). Further, the
adminstrative process appears to be available to set initial amounts of support but not
to modify prior judicial determinations of support amounts. See KRS § 405.430(2).
- KRS § 405.430(1).
9 Some Kentucky courts currently use as guidelines a support scale developed by
the late Hon. Henry Pennington, which differs from the scale developed by the Cabinet
for Human Resources.
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a hearing to dispute the minimum monthly support obligation
under the cabinet's guidelines.9 5 If the obligor does not request
such a hearing, the first payment on the support obligation
becomes due in twenty days. The obligor may be excused from
payment only if a hearing officer later determines that the ob-
lgor had good cause for failing to request the hearing.
9 6
In addition to the administrative process, Kentucky has
adopted new legislation to comply with a federal mandate for
wage withholding procedures. 97 Courts are now required to use
wage withholding when the full amount of a support obligation
is thirty-two days delinquent. 98 Both the federal act and the
language of the Kentucky statute indicate that this requirement
is not subject to judicial discretion and that it applies in all
judicial enforcement proceedings. 99
State legislation also gives the CHR Secretary the ability to
issue an order to withhold and deliver earnings or property which
the Secretary has reason to believe belong, or are owed, to the
delinquent parent.'00 An order to withhold and deliver may be
a powerful tool because it has priority over all other debts of
the obligor parent. 10'
Although no cases have as yet arisen under the statute, it
95 See KRS § 405.440.
96 Id.
9' See KRS §§ 405.460, .465.
" Id. This process raises some of the due process problems underlying Mitchell v.
W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 603-20 (1974) (Louisiana law allowing issuance of writ
of sequestration without prior notice involves due process issues); Fuentes v. Shevin,
407 U.S. 67, 80-93 (1972) (prejudgment replevin laws allowing seizure of property without
hearing violates the due process clause); or Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S.
337, 340-42 (1969) (garnishment of wages without prior hearing or notice violative of
employee's right to due process).
- See 42 U.S.C. § 446(a)(8); KRS § 405.465. The Kentucky statute states that "in
any proceeding" in which "a court" has ordered payment, automatic withholding may
be used upon a showing of the required delinquency. See Dodson & Horowitz, supra
note 88, at 3053.
I- See KRS § 405.470 (1984).
101 Id. Further, that priority is not subject to court discretion as are the priorities
for wage assignments under KRS § 405.465. However, orders to withhold and deliver
are subject to the exemptions for debtor's tools under KRS § 427.030 (1980); professional
libraries and vehicles under KRS § 427.040 (1980); and homestead and burial plot
exemptions under KRS § 427.060 (1980). Other attachments and executions for child
support are subject only to the last of these three exemptions. KRS § 427.045 (1980).
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will undoubtedly generate both increased collection of child sup-
port obligations and litigation to interpret its meaning.
Child support obligations owed by a nonresident have his-
torically been difficult to collect.10 2 A Kentucky Court of Appeals
case, Abbott v. Abbott,103 however, demonstrates the increased
vigor with which such obligations are currently being pursued.
The Abbott litigation involved two problems: Child support for
a dependent adult child and a foreign jurisdiction's power to
modify a support order.
Brenda Abbott brought suit to remove a lien which had been
imposed upon the marital home to preserve Carl Abbott's mar-
ital share of the home.' ° Brenda argued that the lien should be
removed because of Carl's delinquent support obligations. 0 5
Brenda and Carl's older son was severely mentally retarded, and
Brenda claimed that the delinquency included amounts due for
the older, retarded child after his eighteenth birthday.' 6 Carl
argued that a child's eighteenth birthday terminates a parent's
support obligations. 10 7 The appellate court held that statutory
provisions terminating chld support at emancipation,0 8 and set-
ting that age at eighteen, 19 were not relevant to the support of
wholly dependent children over the age of eighteen." 0
In spite of its simple and appropriate answer to the question
of support for dependent adult children, Abbott raises other
serious questions regarding the adjudication of support obliga-
tions for an absent parent. The problems stem from the court's
102 See generally D. CHAMBERS, MAKING FATHERS PAY (1979).
0 673 S.W.2d 723 (Ky. Ct. App. 1983).
-o' Id. at 725.
105 Id.
10 Id. at 724-25.
I07 Id.
103 See KRS § 403.250(3) (1984).
" See KRS § 2.015 (1980).
10 673 S.W.2d at 725. The court relied upon KRS § 405.020(2) (1984) which awards
to both parents the joint custody, care and support of children over the age of eighteen
who are wholly dependent because of permanent physical or mental disability. It did
not discuss difficulties with that statute's requirement that the father be primarily liable
for such support. Support responsibilties that have been allocated or denied on the basis
of gender have been subject to equal protection challenges. See Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S.
268 (1979) (equal protection clause violated by Alabama law imposing alimony only on
husbands).
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interpretation of the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Sup-
port Act (URESA)"' and from its failure to adequately explain
the grounds for its decision." 2
Although the appellate court did not so state, Carl Abbott's
extended absence from Kentucky must be presumed. Carl was
described by the court as a Pennsylvania resident.1 13 Further,
Brenda's use of URESA"14 to enforce her support claims indi-
cates that personal jurisdiction over Carl was not available in
Kentucky."' When Brenda's action was heard in Pennsylvania,
that state's courts purported to reduce Carl's support obligation
because the parties' younger child resided with Carl." 6 Carl
raised that reduction as a defense to Brenda's action to have his
lien on the marital home removed."17 The court of appeals held
first that the Pennsylvania court's reduction was ineffective be-
cause Brenda did not receive notice of the proceeding and was
not subject to that court's jurisdiction." 8 The court treated the
Pennsylvania order as a judgment but refused to award it full
faith and credit since it was rendered without personal jurisdic-
tion over the respondent." 9
See 673 S.W.2d at 727.
" See notes 131-34 infra and accompanying text.
See 673 S.W.2d at 726.
1" See KRS § 407.010 (1984). Both Kentucky and Pennsylvania have adopted the
act. For Pennsylvania's version of the act, see 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 6741-6780
(Purdon 1978).
"' Personal jurisdiction was necessary to establish the original support order. See
Kulko v. California Super, Ct., 436 U.S. 84,87 (1978). Further, personal jurisdiction
was necessary for modification of a prior order. See id at 91-101. In prior decisions,
the Kentucky Supreme Court has ruled that Kentucky will not assert jurisdiction over
child support modification when a Kentucky court would decline jurisdiction under the
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act. See McCormick v. McCormick, 623 S.W.2d
909, 910 (Ky. 1981). McCormick is distinguishable from Abbott because both the child
and one parent continued to live in Kentucky in the latter case.
116 673 S.W.2d at 7.6.
17 Id. at 726-27.
M' Id. at 727.
119 Id. It is unclear whether a responding state court order is a judgment that
supercedes the prior support order. See, e.g., Murphy v. Murphy, 395 So. 2d 1047, 1049
(Ala. Civ. App. 1981) (sister state's child support judgments given full faith and credit,
but court may specifically modify its application as to future installments); Campbell v.
Jenne, 563 P.2d 574, 577 (Mont. 1977) (Montana court may only modify sister state's
prior child support judgment by specifically referring to it); Foster v. Marshman, 611
P.2d 197, 199 (Nev. 1980) (subsequent Nevada judgment did not modify an earlier
California order that required greater support payments).
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As a constitutional matter, courts of a state without personal
jurisdiction over the recipient of a support obligation may not
alter or cut off that obligation.' 20 Outside of URESA, when a
litigant appears in a foreign state to request enforcement of a
support obligation, the litigant will have sufficiently purposefully
availed himself or herself of the benefits of the forum to be
subject to the forum's jurisdiction. 2' Under those circumstances,
a court in a second state may constitutionally modify the support
award to the same extent as the state rendering the initial award.'2
URESA provides, however, that a party who participates in a
proceeding does not subject himself or herself to jurisdiction in
"any other proceeding."' 23 The Kentucky Court of Appeals in-
terpreted that section of the statute to bar Carl Abbott's action
for modification of support with regard to the child who resided
with him.' 24 The court treated support orders for the children as
two separate and independent actions. 125 While the apparent
absence of notice to the Kentucky parent seeking enforcement
of the support order clouds the issue, the court of appeals'
reading of the statute does not correspond with the general
interpretation of the statute by other state courts. The section is
typically interpreted as barring an obligor from raising child
custody or visitation rights in a support enforcement proceed-
ing.' 26 The section would not appear to bar a modification
request similar to that made in Abbott.'27 Even more egregiously,
the Kentucky court determined Abbott's duty toward his retarded,
120 See Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 548-49 (1948).
"I See Kulko v.California Super. Ct., 436 U.S. at 84.
2 New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610, 612 (1947).
"' UNIF. RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT § 32, 9A U.L.A. 643 (1979).
See also 42 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 6772.
'1 See 673 S.W.2d at 727.
125 See id.
'26 See Leland v. Fricke, 376 So. 2d 432, 433 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (while
URESA does give the court the power to establish support payments, it does not give
the right to establish visitation rights); Brown v. Turnbloom, 280 N.W.2d 473, 474
(Mich. Ct. App. 1979) (judge may not look to fulfillment of visitation rights as factor
in determining compliance with support obligations); Pifer v. Pifer, 229 S.E.2d 700, 703
(N.C. Ct. App. 1976) (defendant husband's cessation of support payments in response
to wife's refusal to allow visitation not within the parameters of the URESA).
127 The real question, aside from the notice problem, is how the Pennsylvania court
would interpret § 32. If Brenda Abbott had been given notice of the proceedings and
Pennsylvania had modified Carl's support duty, would that modified order have su-
perceded the Kentucky judgment in a Pennsylvania court? There is some evidence that
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dependent child under Kentucky law. 28 Both the Kentucky and
the Pennsylvania versions of URESA call for the determination
to be made under Pennsylvania law. 29 Indeed, it is possible that
application of Kentucky's law to determine Carl Abbott's duty
of support was unconstitutional.10
The muddled opinion in Abbott is unfortunate because the
court did reach a correct result. Pennsylvania permits modifi-
cation of a prior court order in a URESA proceeding. 3' How-
ever, Pennsylvania courts recognize that the URESA order does
not alter the obligation under the original judgment.3 2 Thus, an
obligor ordered to pay $50 per month in an original divorce
proceeding might succeed in having that obligation lowered to
$40 in a URESA proceeding. Amounts paid under that order
are credited to the obligor, and the difference becomes an ar-
rearage under the initial judgment.133 If Carl Abbott's arrearages
had been so analyzed the court would have had jurisdiction over
Abbott to remove the lien from the marital home in spite of his
continued absence from Kentucky. Due process does not require
minimum contacts with the obligor for postjudgment attach-
ment. 34 Thus, Carl's personal connection with Kentucky would
have been relevant only if the court wished to assess against him
an amount greater than the lien on the home.
III. CHILD CUSTODY
A. Jurisdiction
In Toth v. Monzingo,'" the Kentucky Court of Appeals faced
the recurrent problem of an interstate custody dispute. Elizabeth
it would not. See Silverstein v. Silverstein, 371 A.2d 948, 949-50 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1977).
See 273 S.W.2d at 725-26.
See KRS § 407.120 (1984); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 6747.
" Cf. Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 409 (1930) (court may not apply a
state statute to an agreement made outside the state which would allow a shorter term
within which to bring suit than that agreed to by the parties).
371 A.2d at 949.
"n See id. at 950.
I d. at 951-52.
is' Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 201 n.18 (1977) (in a stockholder's derivative
suit, due process requires that all assertions of state jurisdiction meet the "minimum
contacts" requirements).
"I No. 83-CA-2560-MR (Ky. Ct. App. June 29, 1984).
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Toth was awarded custody of the parties' minor children when
she was divorced from Reginald Monzingo in Texas in 1979.136
Without notice to Monzingo, Toth moved the children to Lex-
ington, Kentucky in December 1982.137 In February 1983, Mon-
zingo filed a petition for modification of the original Texas
custody decree in a Texas court.'38 Some three months later
Toth filed a petition to modify the Texas decree in Fayette
County, Kentucky circuit court. 139 Monzingo moved to dismiss
the Kentucky proceeding on the ground that Kentucky lacked
personal jurisdiction over him. 140 Additionally, he asserted that
Kentucky statutes did not permit adjudication of the modifica-
tion when another proceeding was already pending before the
Texas court.1 41 The Fayette circuit court agreed with Monzingo
and dismissed Toth's petition for modification.
On appeal the Kentucky Court of Appeals rejected arguments
by both parties because it recognized that the case was controlled
by the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act of 1980 (PKPA). 42
Judge Clayton's carefully reasoned opinion first noted that the
PKPA forbids modification of prior custody decrees except upon
316 Id. slip op. at 1.
117 Id. slip op. at 2.
133 Id.
Id. slip op. at 2-3.
The Kentucky version of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act [herein-
after cited as UCCJA] purports to bind all parties who have been notified under the
act's provisions. See KRS § 403.510 (1984). That section of the act may be unconstitu-
tional when applied to a parent in Monzingo's position. In May v. Anderson, 345 U.S.
528 (1953), the Supreme Court, in a plurality opinion, ruled that a state could not
constitutionally deprive a parent, over whom it had no personal jurisdiction, of custody.
In a concurring opinion, Mr. Justice Frankfurter opined that due process would not be
offended if a state cut off the absent parent's custody rights although nothing in the
full faith and credit clause required a second forum to treat that determination as
conclusive. See id. at 535 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). That concurrence is in part the
basis for UCCJA § 12, 9 U.L.A. 149 Commissioner's comments (1979). The facts of
May are, however, different from those in the Toth litigation. The mother in May had
maintained a marital domicile in Wisconsin prior to her departure for Ohio. Monzingo,
on the other hand, had no prior connection with the state of Kentucky. Whether
Kentucky litigation could have constitutionally determined his custody rights in his
absence is unsettled. Cf. Schaeffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. at 208 n.30.
" See KRS § 403.450 (1984).
141 No. 83-CA-2560-MR, slip op. at 5. The Parental Prevention of Kidnapping Act
is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738A.
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terms dictated by the act. 43 Although the requirements of the
PKPA are similar to those of the Uniform Child Custody Juris-
diction Act (UCCJA), they differ in important respects. 44 Unlike
the UCCJA, the PKPA adopts the notion of continuing juris-
diction. 45 Thus, a state may not modify a prior custody deter-
mination that was rendered consistent with the PKPA if the
rendering state (in this case, Texas) both recognizes the concept
of continuing jurisdiction and remains the residence of one of
the contestants.' 46 Further, at the time that Monzingo filed his
motion to modify the original Texas decree, the children had
been absent from the state of Texas for less than six months. 47
Under the provisions of the PKPA, Texas continued to be the
children's home state 48 and no other state had jurisdiction to
modify a custody decree rendered by Texas courts.
49
Despite the inconvenience to Toth, the custodial parent, the
result of the litigation is fair. Since a Texas court rendered the
custody decree, it is preferable to have a Texas court determine
whether the decree allowed Toth to choose the children's resi-
dence without reference to Monzingo's visitation rights. 150 At
best a Kentucky court would have to speculate over the meaning
of unfamiliar Texas cases in order to reach the meaning of the
Texas decree. The PKPA's recognition of continuing jurisdiction
and its refusal to permit the assumption of "significant connec-
141 See 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(a).
- See generally Foster, Child Custody Jurisdiction: UCCJA and PKPA, 27 N.Y.L.
ScH. L. Rav. 297 (1981) (analysis and comparison of UCCJA and PKPA).
' See U.S.C. § 1738A(d).
, See id. The Texas court erroneously purported to continue jurisdiction in the
case. See Pettiette v. Morrow, 661 S.W.2d 241, 242-43 (Tex. Civ. App. 1983) (continuing
jurisdiction lapses after Texas is no longer the home state).
No. 83-CA-2560-MR, slip op. at 8.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(b)(4).
See 28 U.S.C. § 1738A(a), (c)(2).
'- Toth had been appointed "managing conservator" of the children under the
Texas Family Code. See TEX. FAm. CODE ANN. § 14.02 (Vernon 1983). Monzingo,
however, had significant rights under Texas law. See id. at § 14.03 (1983). To suggest
that Toth's custodial rights removed the case from the purview of the federal statute,
as did the dissenting justice, is to ignore the act's broad purpose as well as the significance
of those rights. See Peterson v. Peterson, 464 A.2d 202, 204 (Me. 1983) (one purpose
of Act is to prevent jurisdictional conflict); Belosky v. Belosky, 640 P.2d 471, 474 (N.M.
1982) (Act intended to prevent both interstate abductions and forum shopping).
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tion" jurisdiction by a new home state represent an attempt to
eliminate multiple state concurrent jurisdiction and the problem
of conflicting orders resulting from such jurisdiction.' 5' Congress
chose to place jurisdiction in the original forum for as long as
it remained the home state or for as long as that state cared to
assume continuing jurisdiction and remained the residence of
one litigant. 52 While this choice may burden mobile parents like
Toth, that inconvenience will generally be outweighed by the
benefits of a single forum rule.
B. Standards for Custody Adjudication
The acknowledged standard for child custody determinations
in Kentucky is the "best interest of the child.' '153 Although
determination of that interest ordinarily permits consideration
of a wide range of factors, some limits are placed upon the
courts.' 54 Some of those limitations derive from the custody
statute itself."' For example, the custody statute requires that
both parents be given equal consideration.' 56 Parental gender,
therefore, may not be the basis for a presumption that a parent
should be given custody of the child.17
In its last term, the United States Supreme Court in Palmore
v. Sidoti' 5s ruled that the race of a stepparent could not provide
" See Foster, supra note 144, at 331-35.
,,2 Flannery v. Stephenson, 416 So. 2d 1034-38 (Ala. Civ. App. 1982) (the state's
'retention of continuing jurisdiction to modify a child custody order precludes sister state
from making such modification); Walsh v. Walsh, 458 N.Y.S.2d 835, 838 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1983) (the forum of original jurisdiction may continue its jurisdiction over a party
who remains a resident in that state); Bahr v. Bahr, 442 N.Y.S.2d 687, 688-89 (N.Y.
Fam. Ct. 1981) (the court must defer to the decree of a sister state who has continuing
jurisdiction over the matter). Nothing in the federal act requires states to adopt the
notion of continuing jurisdiction. In Kentucky, the courts have declined to assert juris-
dicton when the children have been absent for a significant period of time. See, e.g.,
Honigsberg v. Goad, 550 S.W.2d 471, 472 (Ky. 1976).
153 See KRS § 403.270 (1984).
Is- See id.
M" See, e.g., id. ("The court shall not consider conduct of a proposed custodian
that does not affect his relationship to the child.").
136 See id.
'1" See Jones v. Jones, 477 S.W.2d 43, 45 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979) (parent best suited
to raise child should receive custody regardless of sex).
M58 10 FAm. L. RP. (BNA) 2009 (U.S. Apr. 25, 1984) (No. 82-1734).
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a basis for a custody determination that a child's best interest
lay in having his or her custody awarded to the other parent. 15 9
In Powell v. Powell,'+° a case decided while Palmore was under
consideration, the Kentucky Supreme Court held that a trial
court's factual findings that the custodial mother was involved
with a minority ethnic group did not render its opinion defec-
tive.' 6' In Powell, the court refused to assume that trial court
findings that the mother's new husband and many of her friends
were Puerto Rican were the basis for the trial court's decision. 62
Powell provided the court with a difficult case because of
allegations of sexual misconduct on the part of the custodial
mother. 6 13 Under current Kentucky case law, such behavior may
be considered if it is "likely to adversely affect the child."' 164
Although Palmore is distinguishable because racial factors were
found to be a determinative factor in that case, 165 the Powell
trial court's reference to the ethnic background of the mother's
companions is disturbing. If Powell does not violate the letter
of the equal protection clause, it violates its spirit. The Court's
opinion in Palmore also noted that the equal protection clause
barred "consideration" of the "potential injury" to a child
because of "racial bias.' 16 6 It is unfortunate that the Kentucky
Supreme Court chose to downgrade the invidious infection of
racial bias. Even the potential for such bias in a state court
should be carefully guarded against.
IV. ADOPTION
In two cases before the Kentucky courts this survey period,
foster parents have sought to bypass adoption placement regu-
"I See id. at 2010.
M 665 S.W.2d 312, 313 (Ky. 1984).
161 See id. at 314.
162 See id.
'" See id. at 313.
See Krug v. Krug, 647 S.W.2d 790, 793 (Ky. 1983) (standard for admission of
evidence of sexual misconduct is the likelihood that the behavior will adversely affect
the child); S. v. S., 608 S.W.2d 64, 66 (Ky. Ct. App. 1980) (proof of future harm
allowed in determining the best interest of child).
,65 See 10 FAm. L. RP. (BNA) at 2010.
116 See id.
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lations in order to retain custody of children placed with them
by the Cabinet for Human Resources. In Cabinet for Human
Resources v. McKeehan,167 the Cabinet assumed custody of a
child found to be abused and neglected while in the state of
Kentucky.168 The child had been brought to Kentucky by its
mother; its father remained in Michigan, the state in which the
parties had lived. 69 Some time after.the child had been placed
in foster care, the Cabinet and the natural father agreed that
the child should be returned to the father in Michigan. 7 0 The
foster parents sought and received injunctive relief from the
Whitley Circuit Court, preventing the child's return to its father.'
7
'
On appeal the Kentucky Court of Appeals held that the circuit
court lacked jurisdiction to restrain the child's delivery to its
father. 72 The foster parents' claim could not stand as an adop-
tion petition since the child had not been placed for adoption. 73
Further, the child was not available for adoption since the fath-
er's parental rights had never been terminated. 74
In another case, L.S.J. v. E.B.,'17 the appellate court dem-
onstrated even more dramatically that the ability of foster par-
ents to provide a more advantageous lifestyle for a child does
not permit them to avoid the adoption statutes of the state. The
child in L.S.J. was born while the mother was in jail on felony
charges. 76 Consequently the child was placed in foster care.
When the Cabinet for Human Resources sought to remove the
child from the foster parents' home, the foster parents filed a
petition in Morgan Circuit Court to terminate the mother's
parental rights. 77 Although the foster parents later conceded
that they lacked standing to bring this petition, they insisted that
-67 672 S.W.2d 934 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).
161 Id. at 935.
169 Id.
,70 Id. at 935-36.
"I Id. at 936.
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 Id.
175 672 S.W.2d 937 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).
176 Id. at 937.
77 Id. at 938.
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they had a right to bring an adoption petition. 7 8 During pro-
tracted litigation the foster parents continued to claim the child
and successfully blocked the natural mother's requests for vis-
itation with the child. 79 The trial court eventually terminated
the mother's parental rights. On appeal the court of appeals
held that the foster parents had no standing to move for ter-
mination of parental rights, that the circuit court's treatment of
the petition as a petition for adoption was impermissible because
the child had not been placed for adoption, and that the natural
mother's counterclaim for interference with the parent-child re-
lationship and alienation of affection should not have been
dismissed. 80 Both McKeehan and L.S.J. indicate the court's
strong commitment to statutory adoption procedure and warn
against action which attempts to circumvent that procedure.
178 Id.
,79 The court of appeals distinguished the case from Van Wey v. O'Neal, 656
S.W.2d 731 (Ky. 1983). Unlike the parent in Van Wey, L.S.J. had never consented to
a voluntary termination or to placement of her child for adoption. 672 S.W.2d at 940.
110 672 S.W.2d at 939-40.
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